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A PERCEPTION OF IMPROPRIETY: THE USE OF PACKAGE
DEALS IN COLLEGE BASKETBALL RECRUITING
ERICK S. LEE*
ABSTRACT:
In an effort to improve their chances of recruiting elite players to play
for their athletic teams, the use of "package deals" by Division I Men's bas-
ketball teams has increased in recent years. A package deal commonly in-
volves a college offering employment to an associate of an elite athlete in an
effort to entice the athlete to that school. Due to the inherent perception that
such hires are done for an improper purpose, this Article argues that the
NCAA should enact measures to severely curtail the practice of package deals
in the recruitment of Division I basketball players. As the NCAA prides itself
on its mission to "govern competition in a fair, safe, equitable and sports-
manlike manner, and to integrate intercollegiate athletics into higher educa-
tion so that the educational experience of the student-athlete is paramount',
the elimination of the package deal practice will serve to further this goal,
and reestablish an equal playing field for all schools.
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of college sports is replete with examples of educa-
tional institutions recruiting high profile, elite athletes for their
sports teams. Littered among stories of successful collegiate ath-
letes and teams is a panoply of infractions involving university
boosters, coaches, and agents who shower recruits with sums of
cash, gifts of vehicles, and other illegal benefits in an effort to sway
the recruits' college selection to the providing institution.
In modern collegiate athletics, the financial rewards of having
a successful sports program are large when considering the poten-
tial revenue that can come from television broadcasts, merchandise
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School; B.S., University of California, Los Angeles. I am appreciative of Brian A.
Borba and James H. Napper, III, as their comments, discussions and suggestions
were extremely helpful in the writing of this article. I would also like to thank the
editors and staff of the Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law Journal for their
meticulous edits and work in preparing this piece for publication. Lastly, I am
grateful to Alison 0. Stilwell, for her unwavering support and encouragement with
this, and all my other endeavors. I thank her for everything, and dedicate this
article to her.
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sales and other sources.' Given the potential rewards, the motiva-
tion to utilize illegal or unethical means to ensure that a collegiate
team remains successful and competitive has increased. 2 Universi-
ties who wish to remain in the media spotlight, and thus keep the
sports revenue rolling in, may often operate within the outer edges
of legality, employing "rule circumvention, [as opposed to] rule
breaking."3 While the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") has continued to monitor compliance with its bylaws and
ethical guidelines by member institutions, it has limited resources
to police all of its members. 4 Unfortunately, this has meant that
1. See Phil Richards, One Shining Season, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 26, 2009, at
IA (describing recent trends in revenue generating activities of college sports pro-
grams). The online broadcast of these games has generated millions in advertising
revenue, with an estimated $30 million dollars in 2009. See Neil Best, Sports Watch:
CBS' Online Games in Demand, NEWSDAY, Mar. 20, 2009, at A67 (illuminating reve-
nue generating potential of college sports programs through online 'on demand'
games). The free online offering of every game during NCAA March Madness has
generated $4 million in advertising in 2006, about $10 million in 2007 and $23
million last year; it is expected to surpass $30 million in 2009. Id. (discussing spe-
cific profit growth for March Madness On Demand). See also Richard Sandomir,
College Basketball; CBS Will Pay $6 Billion for Men's N. C.A.A. Tournament, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1999, at D5 (discussing contract between NCAA and CBS Sports for rights
to televise NCAA Men's Basketball Championship Tournament for 11 years at cost
of $6 billion). In the case of college football, ESPN recently negotiated with the
Bowl Championship Series, the outfit in charge of organizing college football's
postseason, and signed a television contract valued at $500 million over four years.
See Iliana Limon, Obama: 'Yes, We Can' BCS: No, We Can't, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan.
20, 2009, at DI (examining blockbuster sports broadcast contracts). In yet another
means for individual universities to earn extra revenue, schools commonly enter
into merchandising agreements with apparel manufacturers to outfit their athlet-
ics teams, with these agreements routinely valued in the millions of dollars. See,
e.g., Eric Prisbell & Steve Yanda, Shoe Company's Ties With Maryland, Link to Top
Recruit Raise Questions, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2009, at DI (exploring Under Armour's
$17.5 million contract with University of Maryland); see also Notre Dame Signs 10-
year, $60M deal with Adidas, ESPN.coM, Nov. 9, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncf/news/story?id=2218912 (detailing athletics manufacturer's contract to supply
the university's 26 varsity teams with footwear and apparel).
2. See William C. Rhoden, For Coaches, Recruiting Top Players Can Lead to a Dark
Side, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at D4 ("The N.C.A.A.'s problem is that big-time
intercollegiate athletics create a pressure cooker and place coaches 'in highly com-
petitive environments where there is a culture of cheating."'); see also Jerry Sulli-
van, There's a Wealth of Reasons to Question Coaches' Integ-ity, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 4,
2009, at BI ("When college coaches get cornerback money, you know things are
getting out of hand. Is it any wonder that coaches are tempted to bend the NCAA
rules to get players? If signing some 18-year-old jump shooter could help you hit
the lottery, wouldn't you take a chance?").
3. Dana O'Neil, Gray Scale: Recruiters Struggle With Perfectly Legal Yet Ethically
Questionable, ESPN.coM, Nov. 18, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/columns/
story?id=3710807.
4. See DON YAEGER, UNDUE PROCESS: THE NCAA's INJUSTICE FOR ALL 253-54
(Sagamore Publishing 1991) (noting that NCAA's Enforcement Division, which is
responsible for policing illegal conduct by its member institutions, has historically
been overworked and undermanned).
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only the more egregious violations have been addressed while some
more insidious practices remain unchallenged. 5 One such practice,
that has recently become more newsworthy in light of an investiga-
tion by ESPN's "Outside the Lines" program, is the use of "package
deals" in collegiate recruiting.6 Generally, a package deal involves a
university "hiring... someone related or who has a close relation-
ship to the player to get the recruit. ' 7 Currently, this practice is
permissible under existing bylaws and guidelines. 8 Nonetheless, in
light of the newfound public criticism and scrutiny the NCAA has
launched a focus group to study the use of package deals by mem-
ber institutions.9
The increased prevalence of package deals and the newfound
attention being given by regulatory bodies invites a more in depth
examination into the use of the practice. This Article argues that
the NCAA should enact new restrictions in order to curtail the prac-
tice of package deals, specifically in the recruitment of Division I
basketball players. 10 The NCAA prides itself on its mission to "gov-
ern competition in a fair, safe, equitable and sportsmanlike man-
ner, and to integrate intercollegiate athletics into higher education
so that the educational experience of the student-athlete is para-
5. See, e.g., Bob Dart, NCAA Vows Recruiting Cleanup, A-LANTAJOURNAL-CONSTI-
TUTION, Mar. 12, 2004, at IC (describing proposed NCAA recruiting reforms to
address violations going unpunished amid allegations of recruitment visits involv-
ing sex and drugs).
6. See Outside the Lines: Package Deals (ESPN television broadcast Feb. 17, 2009)
(detailing growing popularity of package deals and impact on collegiate athletics).
7. Chris Foster, Trojans Begin Rebuilding Effort by Beating Washington State, 61-
51, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at D5.
8. See Seth Davis, Behind the NCAA's New Fight Against Package Deals, SI.coM,
Aug. 26, 2008, http://sportsillstrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/seth_davis/08/26/
hoop. thoughts/index.html (looking into impact of package deals and NCAA's
attempts to address practice); see also Jeff Miller, No Rules Were Broken, but USC's
'Package Deal' Isn't Right, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Feb. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/ncaa-coaches-package-2319290-basketball-col-
lege ("Tim Floyd is right. He broke no NCAA rules, did nothing that several other
coaches haven't done . . ").
9. See Davis, supra note 8 (describing establishment of NCAA committee to
monitor package deals); see also Miller, supra note 8 (noting that package deal ar-
rangements are being looked into by NCAA for possible future corrective
legislation).
10. Division I athletics will be the sole focus of this article, as the "[s]chools
with the most financially lucrative athletic programs, including, of course, the ma-
jor basketball and football powerhouses, are found in Division I." W. Burlette
Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1, 6-7
(2000). Certainly, the practice would equally be applicable in the other divisions,
but because the amount of money at stake in Division II and III are significantly
less than in Division I, the effect of any impropriety is also reduced.
2010]
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mount."'1 1 The elimination of the package deal will serve to rein-
force this mission and reestablish an equal playing field for all
schools. 12 Part II of this Article briefly traces the history of cheating
in collegiate recruiting, noting a number of the more egregious ex-
amples of wrongdoing. 13 Part III delves into the recent rise and
increasing prevalence of the practice of package deals in collegiate
basketball recruiting. In addition, this section will explicate a num-
ber of the more common criticisms behind the practice. Part IV of
this Article considers the current legal framework regarding this
practice by discussing the existing provisions the NCAA have to ad-
dress the recruitment of athletes and their applicability to package
deals. In doing so, this section identifies the loopholes in the pre-
sent regulations and bylaws that have permitted this practice to per-
vade the NCAA. Finally, Part V argues that in order to effectuate its
goals of eliminating corruption in college athletics and promoting
ethical competition, the NCAA must enact greater restrictions to
curb the use of package deals by member institutions. 14 To aid in
curtailing this practice, I discuss and propose a number of mecha-
nisms for reform. 15
II. HISTORY OF UNETHICAL AND ILLEGAL ACTRIVITY
IN COLLEGIATE RECRUITING
The instances of illegal conduct in college athletics recruiting
as a whole are voluminous enough to fill a book on the subject, and
would be outside the scope of this Article to rehash that discus-
sion. 16 Nonetheless, to illustrate the variety of tactics that coaches
11. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Our Mission, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.
org/wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/NCAA/About%2OThe%2ONCAA/Overview/mission.
html.
12. See generally Davis, supra note 8 (portraying current issues concerning
package deals and NCAA's displeasure with practice and their hope to correct it).
13. For a discussion highlighting wrongdoing in collegiate recruiting, see in-
fa notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
14. This article will refer to the entity providing both the scholarship offer to
the basketball player, and the employment offer to the player's associate as the
university, school, or coach interchangeably. While it is often the case that a uni-
versity's athletic department is a pseudo self-governing entity and detached from
the university at large, for the purposes of this article, I have imputed the decisions
of a basketball team's coach to the institution as well. Even where a school's ath-
letic department has significant influence on their own merits, the university as a
whole nonetheless retains some measure of supervisory power.
15. For discussion of the possible changes the NCAA may implement see infra
notes 135-183 and accompanying text.
16. See generally BRUCE FELDMAN, MEAT MARKET: INSIDE THE SMASH-MOUTH
WORLD OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL RECRUITING (ESPN Books 2007); DAN WETZEL &
DON YAEGER, SOLE INFLUENCE: BASKETBALL, CORPORATE GREED, AND THE CORRUP-
[Vol. 17: p. 59
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A PERCEPTION IN IMPROPRIETY
have employed, in order to gain an edge in recruiting impact play-
ers to their programs, this section discusses a number of the more
high profile incidents of illicit recruiting.
The payment of money to steer an athlete toward a particular
school has historically been considered an improper method of
recruiting.' 7 In 1988, University of Kentucky assistant basketball
coach Dwane Casey mailed a sum of cash to the Los Angeles home
of recruit Chris Mills.18 Fatefully, the package was accidentally
opened in transit, prompting an investigation that ultimately led to
sanctions against the University, including post-season bans and
monetary fines. 19 In the wake of the scandal, Kentucky coach Ed-
die Sutton resigned, and the player at the center of the maelstrom,
Chris Mills, was barred from ever playing basketball for the
University. 20
More recently, in 2002, allegations that a football recruit was
paid to attend the University of Alabama led to probationary sanc-
tions against the school.21 The scandal centered on the behavior of
defensive tackle Albert Means' high school coaches, who were ac-
cused of "brokering their star player to the highest bidder."22 Sub-
sequent investigations by the NCAA, federal law enforcement, and
other universities revealed a sordid system whereby other schools,
not merely the University of Alabama, were throwing cash and gifts
at Means' associates in hopes of landing the player. 23 These investi-
TION OF AMERICA'S YOUTH (Grand Central Publishing 2000); ALEXANDER WOLFF &
ARMEN KETEYIAN, RAW RECRUITS (Pocket Books 1990) (exploring history of unethi-
cal tactics in collegiate athletics recruiting).
17. See Feldman, supra note 16, at 55-57 (noting extent to which universities
go to in order to convince high profile athletes to matriculate).
18. See William C. Rhoden, Scandal at Kentucky Lingers Beyond Sutton, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2004, at D3 (addressing career ups and downs of Dwane Casey in-
cluding letter of money addressed to Chris Mills' father while at Kentucky).
19. See William C. Rhoden, Kentucky's Basketball Program and 2 Players Heavily
Penalized, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1989, at §1, p. 1 (addressing consequences of money-
filled envelope mailed to student-athlete recruit's home in father's name).
20. See id. (reporting on aftermath of recruiting scandal at University of
Kentucky).
21. See Doug Segrest, Keller Attorneys Say NCAA Used Sting Operation to Get Tide,
BIRmINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 6, 2007, at 5C (recalling NCAA sting operation that
landed University of Alabama on probation in Means scandal); see also Don Yeager,
Paying the Price; The End of the Road Comes for a Figure in a Recruiting Scandal that
Refuses to Die, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 20, 2005, at 20 (recalling Albert Means,
once promising defensive lineman, as center of recruiting scandal which ended
with one booster headed to prison, two schools on probation and several coaches'
careers in disarray).
22. Mark Schlabach, Cleaning Up the SEC: Anatomy of a Scandal, ATLANTAJOUR-
NAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 18, 2002, at 8E.
23. See id. (reporting on money and perks given to Means' inner-circle such as
buying groceries and paying some bills for his family). There were allegations that
2010]
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gations also revealed the existence of "slush funds," which were part
of systematic efforts by universities to buy star athletes.24 In the
wake of the scandal, Means' former high school coaches were in-
dicted by a federal grand jury on charges of conspiracy, bribery,
and extortion. 25
Furthermore, schools may also provide recruits with other im-
proper benefits, as illustrated by media reports in 2004 which al-
leged that the University of Colorado football team provided
"alcohol, strippers and prostitutes" to recruits at university spon-
sored parties.26 While the use of attractive females is often a com-
mon recruiting tactic, the events at Colorado took this strategy to a
new and inappropriate level.2 7 Later investigations by the Univer-
sity revealed the use of sex as a tool to lure recruits; it was reported
that players on the team would arrange for strippers from local
clubs to meet with recruits, and that athletic department recruiting
coordinators had called escort services for parties.28 One particu-
larly wild party led to allegations of rape against Colorado players
and recruits by three women who attended the gathering. 29
Means' high school coaches received free hotel stays, meals, cash and free entry
into "golf outings, fantasy football camps and booster clubs" while Means was be-
ing recruited. Id.
24. See id. (noting that payments to high school coaches of elite athletes, pay-
ments of dormitory rent and meals, gifts of apparel, complimentary standardized
test courses, and shopping sprees were exposed as common uses of slush funds).
25. See Mark Schlabach, College Recruitment Tale of Greed; Means Scandal Leads to
Bribery, Extortion Charges, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Sept. 23, 2001, at 1 lF
(reporting that Means' coaches were indicted in connection with recruiting
improprieties).
26. See Special Prosecutor to Probe Colorado, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2004, at D02
(reporting that recruits were given illegal substances and women to entice them to
sign).
27. See Carroll Rogers, Recruiting Becomes Women's Work, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Feb. 2, 2003, at ID (describing "recruiting hostess" program and its
use in attracting athletic recruits to particular university). While the official func-
tion of these hostesses is to serve as volunteer tour guides, many universities also
employ these girls in clerical and organizational functions. See id. Rogers, how-
ever, relates a number of examples of the lines blurring, detailing instances where
a recruit and his hostess engaged in a sexual relationship. See id. (noting that
occasionally hostess go beyond their formal duties).
28. See Kelli Anderson & George Dohrmann, Out Of Control?, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, Feb. 23, 2004, at 64 (portraying tawdry recruiting practices employed by
the University of Colorado). As the article noted, a Denver strip club owner admit-
ted to sending strippers to University of Colorado recruiting parties for the last 20
years. See id. (reporting Harbodies Entertainment had been sending strippers, yet
never had coaches made requests).
29. See id. (reporting how alleged rape of women raised questions about foot-
ball program and tawdry recruiting practices and Colorado which led to subse-
quent grand jury investigation into matter and indictment of assistant coach). Two
of the alleged victims are currently pursuing a civil suit against the University
under Title IX, arguing that their assaults were the result of Colorado's failure to
[Vol. 17: p. 59
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss1/2
A PERCEPTION IN IMPROPRIETY
Most recently, Indiana University's head basketball coach,
Kelvin Sampson, was implicated in a scandal involving violations of
NCAA rules governing communication with recruits.3 0 Soon there-
after, the University of Connecticut's Jim Calhoun, another promi-
nent college basketball coach, was also accused of violating NCAA
communication rules. 31 Both coaches were accused of calling and
text messaging high school athletes in gross excess of communica-
tion limits imposed by the NCAA.32
III. THE RISING POPULARITY OF PACKAGE DEALs
In recent years, the use of package deals to lure elite athletes to
schools has become a common practice in recruiting circles. 33
Generally, the universities engage in this practice by taking one of
three options: the hiring of a player's parent, the hiring of a
player's coach, or the offering of a scholarship to a player's close
supervise their athletes. See Jennifer Brown & Howard Pankratz, Trial Ordered;
Court Revives CU Rape Lawsuit, DENVER POST, Sept. 7, 2007, at A-01 (noting that
Title IX protects women from discrimination in education programs).
30. See Skip Myslenski, Coach on the Brink; Allegations of Major NCAA Violations
Could Cost Indiana's Kelvin Sampson His Job, CHI. TRIm., Feb. 14, 2008, at C1 (noting
that Sampson violated rules by making impermissible phone calls to perspective
players). Sampson had been previously disciplined for "violating rules ... by mak-
ing numerous, impermissible phone calls to prospective players" at a previous uni-
versity. Id. He subsequently reached an agreement with Indiana to leave his
coaching position in the wake of the scandal. Skip Myslenski, Hoosiers pay a price;
Tainted Sampson agrees to $750,000 buyout; players threaten to skip NUgame, CHI. TRIB.,
February 23, 2008, at CI, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?
id=3258506 (setting forth Sampson and Indiana's choice to buyout Sampson's
contract).
31. See Dick Weiss, Calhoun's Legacy on the Line as Recruiting Scandal Swirls,
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 29, 2009, at 46 (reporting that former player, Nate Miles, re-
ceived perks from student-manager). The investigation also turned up over 1500
text messages and phone calls from Calhoun and his staff, to the recruit and his
representatives. See id. (noting not just the manager's involvement, but Head
Coach Calhoun as well).
32. A coach is permitted to telephone a recruit once per week under current
NCAA guidelines, with Sampson and his staff violating this rule more than 100
times during their tenure at Indiana University. See Mark Alesia, What's Ahead for
U's Program?; Sampson's Fate Could Play Role in Possible Punishments, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Feb. 22, 2008, at 1 (reporting Sampson violated NCAA telephone regulations
100 times while at Indiana University). Similarly, Calhoun and his staff are alleged
to have contacted a recruit more than 1500 times. See Michael Rosenberg, No Place
to Hide, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 3, 2009, at 7 (reporting that Yahoo! Sports found
1,565 calls and text messages between UConn coaches and sports agent Josh
Nochimson).
33. See Ryan Canner O'Mealy, Package Deals Common in Recruiting, ESPNRISE.
cOM, Nov. 21, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/highschool/rise/basketball/boys/
news/story?id=3717455 (detailing practice of package deals and recent escalation
of practice).
2010]
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friend. 34 This article primarily discusses the use of package deals in
college basketball, where the practice is particularly widespread.
A. Hiring a Player's Parent
One of the first and more significant instances of a package
deal occurred at the University of Kansas in 1983.35 Kansas head
basketball coach Larry Brown recruited highly touted prospect
Danny Manning to play on his team, a tremendous feat considering
that most people at the time believed Manning to be a lock to sign
with the University of North Carolina. Two days prior to Manning's
official announcement, his father Ed was hired by Brown as an assis-
tant head coach on the Kansas staff.36 This hiring was viewed as
suspect since Ed Manning had spent the three years prior working
as a truck driver.37 While the hiring was lampooned by skeptics as a
textbook example of a package deal, Ed Manning's credentials in-
cluded a nine season professional playing career and a one-year as-
sistant coaching stint at a university. 38  Irrespective of the
controversy accompanying Manning's recruitment, the arrange-
ment ultimately turned out to be fruitful for the University of Kan-
sas, as he led the team to the national championship in 1988.39
After a seventeen year layoff, Kansas returned to the package
deal strategy in 2005 to entice standout player Mario Chalmers. 4°1
Chalmers has since etched his name in Kansas lore, by making a
game-tying three point basket in the 2008 National Championship
34. See Davis, supra note 8 (noting there is more than one way to construct
package deal).
35. SeeJohn Garrity, He's Manning for the Future, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 17,
1983, at 78 (detailing controversy that surrounded Danny Manning's commitment
to play for Kansas).
36. See id. (noting Ed Manning's ascension from truck driver to basketball
coach). For further discussion of Kansas' hiring practices, see infra notes 40-44
and accompanying text.
37. See Garrity, supra note 35, at 78-80 (reporting that many were skeptical of
Ed Manning's hiring).
38. See id. at 80 (discussing reasons Larry Brown gave for hiring Ed Manning).
39. See Curry Kirkpatrick, A One Man Show; Danny Manning Rose Far Above
Oklahoma to Lift Upstart Kansas to the NCAA Championship, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr.
11, 1988, at 18 (illustrating Manning's importance to Kansas' defeat of Oklahoma
in 1988 NCAA Championship).
40. See Mark Dent, Ronnie Chalmers Resigns: Director of Basketball Operations Ron-
nie Chalmers Decides to Pursue Other Interests U. DAILY KANSAN, Aug. 12, 2008, available
at http://www.kansan.com/stories/2008/aug/12/chalmersresigns (examining
arrival of both Chalmers men at Kansas following Mario's recruitment and depar-
ture of both Chalmers men from Kansas following Mario's assent to NBA).
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game against the University of Memphis. 41 Kansas later won the
game in overtime, bringing the school its first national champion-
ship since the aforementioned Danny Manning team in 1988.42
Looking on from the bench during the memorable 2008 Champi-
onship game was Ronnie Chalmers, the Director of Basketball Op-
erations for the Jayhawks, and Mario's father.43 Ronnie Chalmers
was appointed to the position after his son's commitment to play
for Kansas, a position from which subsequently resigned from once
Mario turned to the NBA. 44
Similarly, in 2005 the University of Southern California
("USC") hired Rudy Hackett as the Strength and Conditioning
Manager of their men's basketball team. 45 Rudy's son Daniel, a
high school standoutjoined USC the following year. 46 As the child
of an employee of the University, Daniel Hackett "receive[d] free
tuition, which open[ed] up another scholarship for .. . [USC] to
use."47 Under NCAA regulations, basketball teams may allocate
only thirteen scholarships for each year's roster.48 As such, circum-
venting this rule via a package deal, as was done in this case, has led
the NCAA to look into closing the loophole.49 USC also hired
Dwayne Polee to serve as their Director of Basketball Operations. 50
41. See Pete Thamel, Chalmers and Kansas Are Swinging on a Star, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 2008, at D3 (discussing Chalmers' role in Kansas' 2008 NCAA
championship).
42. Id. (highlighting Kansas' national twenty year national championship
drought).
43. Id. (noting Ronnie Chalmers' presence on bench).
44. See Mark Kriegel, A March Madness Scandal the NCAA Sanctions, FoxSPORTS.
cOM, Mar. 18, 2009, http://msn.foxsports.com/cbk/story/9344918/A-March-Mad-
ness-scandal-the-NCAA-sanctions (comparing Kansas' latest father-son signing to
signing Manning in 1983).
45. See Associated Press, Report: NCAA Looks Into Hackett's USC Arrangement,
ABCNEWS.COM, Feb. 20, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory?id=6918
794 (explaining part of package deal).
46. Player Bio: Daniel Hackett, USCTROJANS.COM, http://usctrojans.cstv.com/
sports/m-baskbl/mtt/hackettdaniel00.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
47. Associated Press, supra note 45.
48. See 2008-09 NCAA DIVI sIoN I MANUAL, §15.5.5.1, 185 (July 2008), available
at http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/Division 1_Manual_200809e
9e568al-c269-4423-9ca5-16d6827c16bc.pdf (providing all NCAA rules and regula-
tions) [hereinafter NCAA BmLAws].
49. See Michael Lev, USC Falls to Washington, ORANGE CouNTrv REGISTER, Feb.
22, 2009, available at http://headlines.ocregister.com/sports/hackett-14690-usc-
points.html (outlining Daniel Hackett's performance in game in light of contro-
versy surrounding his recruitment).
50. See Player Bio: Dwayne Polee, USC Official Site, http://www.usctrojans.com/
sports/m-baskbl/mtt/polee-dwayneO0.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (displaying
Dwayne Polee's profile and position with University). Polee was hired by the team
in spite of a single game professional NBA career, and a single season as an assis-
tant coach at a Southern California community college. See Ben Bolch, College Bas-
2010]
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Polee's son, Dwayne Jr., previously accepted an offer to play basket-
ball for USC prior to entering high school. 51 As in the case with
Daniel Hackett, Dwayne Polee Sr.'s status as a university employee
would permit his son to attend the school without having to use one
of the NCAA allotted scholarships. 52
Parental package deals may not necessarily require employ-
ment with the athletic team itself.53 Soon after her elite basketball
player son's commitment, Chris Duhon's mother Vivian Harper
moved to North Carolina and began a position at a money manage-
ment firm headed by a Duke University booster, despite questiona-
ble qualifications for the position. 54 Similarly, a year later, a
pharmaceutical company hired the father of Duke forward Carlos
Boozer soon after Carlos joined the team. 55 The head of the com-
pany was close friends of Duke Head Coach Mike Krzyzewski, impli-
cating that the hiring was partly due to Carlos Boozer's status as a
Duke player.5 6 When questioned about the matter, the parties re-
jected arguments that there were any prearranged provisions, with
the only thing provided being contact information for hiring
managers. 57
B. Hiring a Player's Coach
While the employment of an athlete's father is one common
example of a package deal, an equally common tactic is to hire the
athlete's high school or Amateur Athletic Union as a team coach. 58
ketball Notes - Polee, Father of Tp Recruit, Gets USCJob, L.A. TIMES, August 24, 2007,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/24/sports/sp-colhoops24.
51. Adam Maya, 'Package Deal' Report Upsets USC's Hackett, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, Feb. 20, 2009, available at http://www.ocregister.com/articles/hackett-
usc-rudy-2313849-espn-son.
52. See id. (discussing the specific issue of parents freeing up team scholar-
ships by virtue of their university employment).
53. Josh Peter, Sweet Ride, TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEw ORLEANS, LA), Apr. 3, 2003,
at Sports 1.
54. Id. Harper's position was never publicly posted by the company, with the
reason for her moving attributed to the fact that Duhon was "going to play for
Duke." Id.
55. See Bob Ryan, No Clean Getaways, BosToN GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2003, at D1 (re-
porting that Carlos Boozer's father got job at GlaxoSmithKline, which is owned by
close friend of Duke's basketball coach).
56. See id. (suggesting possibility that Carolos Boozer's signing to Duke was
result of package deal).
57. Peter, supra note 53 (blocking potential questionable actions through
statements).
58. See, e.g., Seth Davis, Walking a Fine Line; Package Deals Aren't Right, But Are
Part of the Game, SI.com, Nov. 21, 2006, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/
writers/sethdavis/11/21/hoop.thoughts/index.html (explaining package deals
in their various forms). In recent years, elite basketball players have become more
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In his two years at Arizona State University, James Harden collected
a number of honors including recognition as a First Team All-
American and the player of the year of the Pacific Ten Conference
in 2009.59 Harden's signing with Arizona State was a major surprise
in recruiting circles; the Sun Devils are not a major powerhouse in
college basketball, so critics attributed Harden's unexpected deci-
sion to the university's coincidental hiring of his former high
school coach. 60 Scott Pera left coaching high school basketball in
2006 to take a position as Director of Basketball Operations at Ari-
zona State. 61 Just eight weeks after Pera's hiring, Harden an-
nounced his decision to play for the Arizona State Sun Devils. 62
While there was certainly no guarantee that hiring Pera would land
Harden, anecdotal evidence suggests that it was a near certainty.63
Another All-American player, Michael Beasley, faced similar
controversy as the subject of a package deal during his recruitment
involved in traveling club basketball teams, which offer players greater exposure to
universities and coaches than traditional high school basketball. See Marlen Garcia
and Barry Temkin, High Schooling; When the Prep Basketball Season End That's When
the High-Stakes Games Begin, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 2004, at CI (describing shift of ama-
teur players recognition of importance of AAU season). These teams are often
sponsored by major shoe companies and travel across the country playing in tour-
naments organized by the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU). See generally id. (illus-
trating connection between AAU tournaments and corporate sponsors). AAU
basketball critics point to over involvement in athletic shoe company money, lack
of any oversight on an institutional level and its prospects of violating amateurism
regulations and principles. See id.; see also Eric Prisbell, Summer Programs Feeling the
Heat; NCAA Viewed as Trying to Regulate Basketball Leagues, Coaches, WASH. POST, May
17, 2004, at D1 (commenting on NCAA's attempted involvement with issue by la-
beling one summer coach as representative of major university, thereby sanction-
ing that program); Bob Hohler, Wading in Cesspool; System Might Reek, But There's No
Stopping Cash Flowing to Amateurs, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 2006, at El (observing
inevitable and sanction free nature of AAU and summer leagues).
59. See NBA.com Staff Writers, Arizona St. 's Harden Among Latest Players to Enter
NBA Draft, NBA.coM, Apr. 8, 2009, http://www.nba.com/2009/news/04/08/draft.
roundup/index.html (listing Harden's awards as evidence of his extraordinary
skills).
60. SeeJeff McLane, Harden Followed Coach to Arizona St., PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar.
18, 2009, at El (discussing bond between Harden and Pera that took them both to
Arizona State).
61. See id. (recounting circumstances of Pera leaving).
62. See id. (quoting Pera as saying that there was good chance Harden would
follow).
63. See Dick Jerardi, Arizona State Guard Harden No Longer a Secret, PHILA. DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 18, 2009, at 77 (reciting classic basketball story of how Harden and
Pera both ended up in Tempe, Arizona). AsJerardi related, Arizona State "coach
Herb Sendek offered Pera the director of basketball operations job... [Sendek]
liked Pera; loved Harden." Id. Furthermore, in response to the news that Arizona
State had offered Pera a position, Harden was noted as remarking "Coach, if you
go to a major school, I'll come with you." Id.
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to Kansas State University. 64 Arguments exist that Beasley had
played for the Wildcats only because the university hired his former
traveling team coach, Dalonte Hill, as an assistant.6 5 Hill previously
mentored and coached Beasley during his days with the DC Assault
AAU team.6 6 After Hill left the DC Assault to coach at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina-Charlotte, Beasley announced that he would
follow and made an oral non-binding commitment.6 7 When Kansas
State offered Hill a position as an assistant coach with the univer-
sity, Beasley soon followed despite his ignorance regarding the
school and its location. 6 8
Likewise, soon after the University of Memphis secured the ser-
vices of freshman point guard, Tyreke Evans, Coach John Calipari
hired Evans' personal trainer, Lamont Peterson, as an administra-
tive assistant for the team. 69 In response to criticism that Peterson's
hiring was made to secure Evans' commitment to the school, Coach
Calipari argued that he "frequently fills entry-level positions with
those looking to break into college coaching." 70 The Evans/Peter-
son arrangement followed in the footsteps of the school's hiring of
Milt Wagner, father of superstar Dajuan Wagner, as Coordinator of
Basketball Operations; this hiring was immediately criticized as a
tactic to lure his son to Memphis. 71 While the elder Wagner was a
former star basketball player at the University of Louisville, critics
argued that he was under qualified since he lacked a college de-
64. See Canner-O'Mealy, supra note 33 (cataloging examples of package deals
across nation).
65. See Marlen Garcia, No Blues in Memphis; Tigers Are Riding 25-Game Winning
Streak Into NCAAs, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 2009, at IC (reminding that head coaches
of other teams are employing package deals to get players)
66. See Dan Wiederer, What's the Deal with John Wall?, FAYETrE OBSERVER (Fay-
etteville, N.C.),Jan. 25, 2009 (disclosing previous relationship between Beasley and
Dalonte Hill, who was his former team coach).
67. See Robyn Norwood, NCAA 's Men's Basketball Tournament: Made for Manhat-
tan, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at DI (illustrating Beasley's alliance to Hill).
68. See Grant Wahl, B-Easy Does It, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 14, 2008, at 66
(relating Beasley's recent success and history behind Beasley and Hill's relation-
ship). Beasley "readily admits, [that Dalonte Hill was] the primary reason the
young star signed with the Wildcats." Id. "My first question for Dalonte was, 'What
is Kansas State?'" says Beasley. "I couldn't find Kansas on a map. I didn't know
[Kansas State] was a big-time school." Id.
69. See Garcia, supra note 65 (noting that Calipari's actions placed him as sub-
ject in controversy of potential package deal).
70. Id.
71. See BW Jones, Kentucky Shrugs Off Calipari's Less Flattering History, Ky. KER-
NEL, Apr. 1, 2009, available at http://kykernel.com/2OO9/O4/O1/uk-has-no-wories-about-
caliparis-past (discussing Calipari's controversial past and targeting his major run-
ins with NCAA, controversial recruiting tactics, questionable player discipline and
shadowy ambassador for his program at Memphis).
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gree. 72 Milt Wagner stayed on the staff of Memphis for an addi-
tional four years after Dajuan left the school to pursue a
professional playing career, thereby tempering critics of the pack-
age deal.73
The University of South Florida debuted Gus Gilchrist as their
budding star player in hopes of changing their fortunes in the noto-
riously difficult Big East conference in 2008.74 Soon after Gilchrist
committed to play for South Florida, the school created the posi-
tion of video and conditioning assistant for his close associate, Ter-
relle Woody. 75 Woody had previously served as Gilchrist's personal
trainer, adviser and spokesman during his AAU playing days. 76
Critics cite this package deal as the reason Gilchrist failed on his
commitment to the University of Maryland. 77 The coach at Mary-
land refused to comply with demands to employ Woody, and pro-
ceeded to release Gilchrist from his letter of intent to play for the
university.78 In light of the often strong bond between a develop-
ing player and his coach or trainer, more examples and demands
for package deals are inevitable in the near future. 79
72. See Andrew Wolfson, Beyond Calipari's Winning Ways; Recruiting, Temper
Questioned, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY), Mar. 31, 2009, at IA
(arguing that Wagner's experience was insufficient for position).
73. See Monte Burke, Back to School. FORBES, Dec. 10, 2007, at 60 (acknowledg-
ing that hiring of Wagner's father was suspicious, but conceding that it was ulti-
mately deemed within permitted rules of behavior).
74. See Greg Auman, Additions Give Boost to USF at Good Time, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (FLORIDA), Dec. 14, 2008, at 3C (describing difficulty of conference and
school's sore need for star athletes); see also Joey Johnston, Ira Kaufman & Nick
Williams, Recruiting in the Shadows, TAMPA TRIB. (FLORIDA), Dec. 14, 2008, available
at http://www2.tbo.com/content/2008/dec/14/140011/na-recruiting-in-the-
shadows.
75. See Brett McMurphy, USF Hires Woody as Assistant, TAMPA TRIB. (FLORIDA),
Aug. 27, 2008, at 5 (stating that USF hired Gus Gilchrest as men's basketball team's
video and coaching assistant).
76. See id. (recounting relationship between Gilchrist and Woody).
77. SeeJohn Feinstein, The Turtle Has Itself to Fear, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2009,
at El (insinuating that Gilchrist was responsible for Woody backing out of his deal
with University of Maryland).
78. See id. (describing why Gilchrist was released from Maryland). The Mary-
land Coach, Gary Williams, has noted that "he refused to allow Gilchrist and
Woody to force him into giving Woody a job." Id.
79. See Roger van der Horst, Wall: A King in Search of a Court, NEWS & OB-
SERVER (Raleigh, NC), Feb. 8, 2009 (maintaining that recruitment of star point
guard John Wall of North Carolina is being closely followed, not only because of
his talent, but also to see if he will follow his mentor and coach to Baylor Univer-
sity). Earlier this year, Baylor hired Dwon Clifton to serve as Director of Player
Development. See id. (unfolding facts that might lure wall to Baylor). Clifton has
addressed criticism that his hiring was a mere ploy to entice Wall to Baylor by
arguing that he was hired long before Wall was to choose a college, and that he
had had a prior connection to a Baylor assistant coach. See id. (defending hiring of
Dwon as untainted and offering alternative explanations).
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C. Granting a Scholarship to a Player's Friend
It is also common for schools to recruit friends and teammates
of star players in hopes of persuading the star athlete to join them
at that university. The University of Memphis has employed this
type of package deal during its recruitment of star player Dajuan
Wagner.80 The University offered Wagner's close friend an athletic
scholarship despite the friend's limited athletic abilities.8 1 Mem-
phis also hired Wagner's father to serve as an assistant coach on the
basketball team. 2 In recent years, the school has also offered an
athletic scholarship to C.J. Henry, despite his lack of recent basket-
ball experience.83 Perhaps not coincidentally, Henry's younger
brother Xavier, an elite prospect among the best players in the
country, decided to commit to Memphis to play college ball.8 4
More recently, the University of Southern California received a
commitment from star high school player Demar DeRozan in
2008.85 Joining DeRozan on the team, and at the podium during
the public announcement of his commitment to USC, was his
friend Romeo Miller.86 Miller, the rap artist formerly known as Lil'
Romeo, and the son of record mogul "Master P", was not consid-
ered to have the athletic ability to play basketball at the Division I
level.8 7 Nonetheless, USC offered Miller a scholarship to play on
80. See Pat Forde, Will theJoke End Up Being On Barnhart?, ESPN.coM, Mar. 31,
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist=forde-pat&id=
4032093&sportCat=ncb (describing package deals in association with Calipari); see
also Michael Rosenberg, The Scene: Like Him or Not, Calipari is Super, DETROIT FREE-
PRESS, Apr. 6, 2008, at SPT1 (describing alleged portion of package deal).
81. See Rosenburg, supra note 80.
82. Jones, supra note 71; see also Wolfson, supra note 72; Burke, supra note 73.
83. See Forde, supra note 80.
84. See id. (noting that Xavier Henry signed with Memphis shortly after his
older brother, C.J. Henry, was offered basketball scholarship with team despite
spending previous three years solely playing professional baseball).
85. See Chris Foster, Nothing But Bottom of Net for DeRozan, L.A. TIMES,Jan. 10,
2009, at DI (discussing University of Southern California's acquisition of
DeRozan).
86. See id. (implying that offer to Miller was part of package deal used to se-
cure acquisition of DeRozan).
87. SeeJon Weinbach, A Hot Prospect?, WALL ST.J., Mar. 7, 2008, at WI, availa-
ble at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20485166974418241.html (discussing fun-
damental purpose behind athletic scholarships). In his senior season at Beverly
Hills High School, Miller was injured for the majority of the season, and even when
he was healthy enough to play his statistics were far from the gaudy accomplish-
ments common in Division I athletes. Id. As Weinbach notes, Romeo Miller never
completed a full season of high school basketball, and averaged less than ten
points per game for a last place team. Id.; see alsoJulian Benbow, USC Duo Demands
Spotlight; One Is a Likely NBA Star, the Other a Famous Rapper, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
17, 2009, at C5 (noting Miller's minimal playing time and low scoring record, both
in high school and at USC).
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the team, due in part to his long-standing friendship with DeR-
ozan. s8 In fact, USC coach Tim Floyd admitted that a package deal
was in place to bring DeRozan and Miller together during the play-
ers' recruitment.89 A scholarship offer to a player with a nonde-
script high school playing career shocked many collegiate
recruiting analysts, leading one to remark that it was "very rare to
give a scholarship to someone who may never play."90
D. Criticisms of the Practice
While the use of package deals is currently legal under NCAA
Bylaws, the practice is not without its detractors.9 1 Many college
coaches have criticized package deals as inherently smarmy.9 2 For
example, Coach Phil Martelli of Saint Joseph's University com-
mented that he was approached by three separate parties for ajob
opening on his staff with the offer that "If you hire me, I can deliver
this guy (high school player) to your program."93 Martelli noted
that the offer "made [his] skin crawl," and made the analogy that
the practice was akin to a form of slavery.94 University of Wisconsin
coach Bo Ryan has also noted that package deals were likely unethi-
cal, but in light of the competitive nature of the business it would
be difficult to legislate against the practice. 95 Other coaches have
acknowledged the presence of the practice, but few have gone on
record condemning the use of package deals. Perhaps this ambiva-
lence is due to a desire to avoid calls of hypocrisy if these same
coaches are ever in the position of being offered a package deal.
Furthermore, coaches recognize that the probability of being
caught arranging a package deal, and the subsequent proof of lia-
bility for such an arrangement by the NCAA is low. Additionally,
88. See Benbow, supra note 87. (questioning whether Miller took advantage of
his friendship with DeRozan to acquire his scholarship and place on team); Foster,
supra note 85. As the article noted "Miller and DeRozan have been friends since
middle school and were teammates on a club team run by Miller's father." Id.
89. See Foster, supra note 85. (citing statements alleging Floyd admitted that
Miller received his scholarship due to his friendship with DeRozan). For example,
as Foster related: "Last April, Mr. Floyd [said], Percy Miller called while driving
both players from a tournament in Fayetteville, Ark. Percy Miller said 'Demar and
Romeo are ready to make their decision, and would you like to have them both on
scholarship?' remembers Mr. Floyd. 'I said absolutely.'" Id.
90. Id.
91. See generally Kriegel, supra note 44 (criticizing NCAA's failure to address
issue of package deals in NCAA basketball recruiting).
92. See, e.g., infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (relating the thoughts of
two prominent college basketball coaches on the topic).
93. Johnson, Kaufman and Williams, supra note 74.
94. Id.
95. See Davis, supra note 8 (discussing prospect regulation of package deals).
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the presence of an elite athlete on a team has the potential to pro-
vide coaches with increased success on the court, appearances in
post season tournaments, increased media exposure, increased fi-
nancial support from boosters, and most importantly, recruiting
acumen for future players. In light of the low risk and potential
high reward, it is not surprising that few coaches are willing to pub-
lically criticize the practice. 96
Package deals have received criticism from the media as well.97
One reporter characterized the practice as "squirrelly" in an article
discussing ethics in college athletics.9 8 Furthermore, the practice
has been riled for being "fraught with potential conflict and impro-
priety."9 9 Critics have also argued that awarding package deals is
not "merely unseemly," but "at best, it gives the appearance of a
conflict." 100 The perception asserted by one critic is that "it's a
form of payment, a way of compensating a player's family for ser-
vices rendered."''1 1
Even if the practice is not outright illegal per NCAA regula-
tions, the employment of package deals to secure the services of
elite athletes at the very least creates the perception of impropriety.
This perception is particularly magnified in cases where the "secon-
dary portion" of the package, i.e. the coach being hired, or the
player being offered a scholarship, is marginally qualified for the
benefit. While the specter of a package deal is lessened where the
parent or coach has years of previous experience to offer, or the
player is an immense talent in their own right, this is often the ex-
ception rather than the rule in these arrangements.
E. Continuing Practice in Face of Scrutiny
Despite increased scrutiny by the media over the inherent ille-
gitimacy of this practice, and calls for reform by coaches, the NCAA
and its member universities have resisted addressing the existence
96. See Steve Wieberg & Marlen Garcia, Troubles Still Shadow College Hoops; Pay-
off, Fraud Reports Sully Men's Game, USA TODAY, June 24, 2009, at IC (describing
change that may occur, as result of NCAA and college coaches associations' at-
tempt to eliminate number of ills of sport).
97. See, e.g., infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (noting comments of
several sports writers).
98. See Kurt Streeter, USC Is Cutting It Pretty Thin, Ethically, L.A. TiMES, May 31,
2009, at C12 (condemning practice of attracting recruits by hiring their parents,
friends or coaches).
99. Miller, supra note 8.
100. Kriegel, supra note 44.
101. Id.
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of package deals. 10 2 This inactivity may be the result of a number of
considerations; the most relevant of which is the effect that re-
straining package deals would have on revenue streams.103 As pre-
viously mentioned, the NCAA and universities earn significant sums
of money from television broadcast rights. 10 4 The television expo-
sure generated by a successful basketball team will more often than
not, increase revenue for the university. 10 5 As a result, schools may
be less apt to restrain themselves from declining to arrange package
deals if, in doing so, it ensures that they remain among the more
competitive and successful teams.10 6 Universities gain financially
from having a successful basketball team, with few coaches willing
to turn down the money, publicity and recruiting boost that may
accompany a package deal. 10 7 The NCAA may also be less willing to
intervene if restricting the practice has the effect of ebbing media
interest in its basketball games, thus slowing one of the organiza-
tion's major revenue sources. 0 8
For the sake of the NCAA's own image, any practice that raises
serious concerns about potential impropriety and unethical con-
duct should be severely restricted, even if that comes at the expense
102. See Canner-O'Mealy, supra note 33 (observing NCAA's lack of action in
addressing the persistence of package deals); see also Davis, supra note 8 (acknowl-
edging tougher legislation will need to be enacted by NCAA in order to address
misuse of package deals).
103. See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
effect of loss of revenue for unsuccessfully performing teams).
104. See generally Richards, supra note 1.
105. See, e.g., Successful Coaches Deserve High-End Salaries, PITSBURGH POST-GA-
ZET-rE, Feb. 24, 2009, at D1 (attributing University of Connecticut's twelve million
dollars in revenue from basketball program in part to television broadcasting
deals); see alsoJoeyJohnston & Mick Elliott, Gators Bank on Winning Ways, TAMPA
TRI.,June 7, 2009, at Local News 1 (identifying direct correlation between televi-
sion exposure and increased revenue); Pete Thamel, Chief of Tennis Tour Will Head
the Pac-lO, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at B15 (noting Pac-10's increase in revenue
due to sports broadcasting deals with its football and basketball programs).
106. See Paul Pringle, USC: Silence is Cardinal Rule; The University Has Not Ad-
dressed Allegations of Improper Benefits for Some of its Athletes, or Questioned Key Accusers,
L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2009, at Cl (noting that among penalties for improper con-
duct by college athletics team is "ban on lucrative television appearances.").
107. See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text (detailing the high mon-
etary value of today's college athletics). See also Marlen Garcia, Infight, Vaccaro's No
Amateur; Promoting Athletes' Rights, Famed Basketball Adviser Squares off Against NBA,
NCAA, USA TODAY, May 12, 2009, at IC (noting the rise in commercialization of
collegiate athletics.).
108. See Michael Hiltzik, Foul Play: The Charade in College Basketbal4 L.A. TIMES,
June 18, 2009, at B1 (commenting on effect of television contracts on NCAA's
reluctance to enact reforms). "The NCAA system is extremely broken ... If the
NCAA wants true amateurism, then don't take money from TV. If it's for-profit,
then let the players participate. Either way, the NCAA would be on higher moral
ground." Id.
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of the organization's major source of funding. If the NCAA is truly
concerned about its founding principles of equal competition
among its member schools, then reform is necessary to stem the
popularity of package deals. Any practice whereby wealthy universi-
ties with large athletic department funds have a higher probability
of securing these arrangements, as opposed to small schools which
cannot meaningfully compete, raises significant concerns as to
equality in competition. Reining in this practice and placating the
questions raised by its critics would aid the NCAA in eliminating the
perception of impropriety surrounding the use of package deals,
and close a loophole being exploited by schools seeking an unfair
advantage.
IV. NCAA BYLAws: ESTABLISHING A HIGH STANDARD
FOR ETHICAL COMPETITION
This article acknowledges that the NCAA concludes that cur-
rent existing bylaws explicitly bar the use of package deals but the
difficulty of proving an intentional arrangement has made the use
of such tactics practically legal, if not widely approved. 10 9 This
standing, however, does not take away from the criticisms and ques-
tion marks surrounding the practice.1 10 As the NCAA has itself rec-
ognized, change and reform is necessary. 1" The Association's
enforcement bureau has warned that college coaches have become
"a little too comfortable with the fact that intent is hard to prove,"
and that the organization will become more aggressive in enforcing
regulations and bylaws.' 1 2 To date, only one coach has been found
liable for violating the rule against conditioning an athlete's com-
mitment to a university on the employment of that athlete's
associate. 1 1
109. See Davis, supra note 8 (relating the concerns of NCAA's associate direc-
tor of enforcement as to possible regulation of package deals).
110. See Kriegel, supra note 44, at 104.
111. See Tom Hoffarth, Our Daily Dread: Check Out That Package, DAILY NEWS
(Los Angeles), Feb. 20, 2009, available at http://www.insidesocal.com/tomhof-
farth/archives/2009/02/our-daily-dread-16.html (according to NCAA associate di-
rector of enforcement LuANN HUMPHREY,
"[the NCAA has] had a difficult time addressing that issue, but in the last
several months since the formation of the basketball focus group we have
tried to become smarter about the basketball recruiting environment. I
think that snowball is rolling down the hill and we need to stop the
bleeding.").
Id.
112. Davis, supra note 58.
113. Former New Mexico State coach Neil McCarthy is the only recent exam-
ple of a coach sanctioned for violating this bylaw back in 1996. See, e.g., Davis,
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It has been a long standing NCAA rule that schools may not
engage in any quid pro quo arrangements in the recruitment of
athletes.1 1 4 As noted in a popular treatise on sports law, the "rules
and regulations included in the NCAA Bylaws are clear ... [there]
can be no improper inducements to lure an athlete to a particular
school."'1 15 Specifically noted as one of "the more common illegal
recruiting practice [s] . . . [is the] arrangement of employment for
relatives of a prospective athlete."'1 16 Nonetheless, despite the
seemingly unmistakable mandate barring the conditioning of a po-
sition on the coaching staff for the athlete's recruitment and the
threat of substantial sanctions, the use of package deals has flour-
ished in part due to difficulty explicitly proving the arrangement's
existence. 117 As I discuss later in this section, universities and
coaches have exploited the loophole permitting package deals, as
proving intent to establish a quid pro quo exchange is a predicate
requirement to finding a violation of the relevant bylaws." 8
As an overarching theme, the NCAA Bylaws establish a funda-
mental principle that collegiate athletics retain attributes of sports-
manship and ethical conduct. 1 9 Evidence of just how greatly the
NCAA values ethical conduct is illustrated by an entire chapter
dedicated to the subject. 120 Article 10.01.1 states that generally, col-
supra note 58; see also NCAA Committee on Infractions, New Mexico State University -
Public Infractions Report, 9 (July 16, 1996) (illustrating regulation of NCAA bylaws).
114. See GEORGE W. SCHUBERT, RODNEY K. SMITH & JESSE C. TRENTADUE,
SPORTS LAW 11 (1986) (noting that the "NCAA Bylaws are clear".., that there "can
be no improper inducements to lure an athlete to a particular school.").
115. Id. (referencing then NCAA Bylaw 1-1-(b)-(1)).
116. Id.
117. See generally, Davis, supra note 58 (discussing prevalence of package
deals).
118. See infra, notes 127-129 and accompanying text noting the difficulties
arising in proving intent.
119. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 48, at art. 2.4 (noting ethical expectations ex-
plicitly expressed within bylaws). The Principle of Sportsmanship and Ethical Con-
duct as noted in Article 2.4 of the NCAA manual, dictates that everyone involved in
collegiate athletics "should adhere to such fundamental values as respect, fairness,
civility, honesty and responsibility," in order "to enhance the integrity of higher
education and to promote civility in society." Id. This principle was not limited to
matters involving competition, but intended to be manifested in "the broad spec-
trum of activities affecting the athletics program." Id. Consequently, the Bylaws
seek to impose the responsibility on universities to conduct their recruiting activity
with this principle in mind, as evidenced by Article 2.11. Id. at art. 2.11. The
NCAA has sought to ensure that recruiting "promote[s] equity among member
institutions in their recruiting of prospective student-athletes and to shield them
from undue pressures that may interfere with the scholastic or athletics interests of
the prospective student-athletes or their educational institutions." Id. at art. 2.4.
120. See generally id. at art. 10 (discussing ethical conduct in collegiate
athletics).
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legiate athletics shall be conducted "with honesty and sportsman-
ship at all times so that intercollegiate athletics as a whole, their
institutions and they, as individuals, shall represent the honor and
dignity of fair play and the generally recognized high standards as-
sociated with wholesome competitive sports."1 2 1 Thus, arguably,
even attempts by schools to act within the gray areas of impermissi-
ble conduct may be considered a violation of the high ethics stan-
dards delineated in Article 10. As a number of commentators have
noted, the inherent unseemliness and impropriety associated with
the use of package deals should have raised red flags within the
NCAA, since the practice is fundamentally inconsistent with the
higher standards of ethical conduct under the bylaws. 122 This point
is particularly relevant since a latter subsection in Article 10 specifi-
cally lists a number of actions which may be deemed unethical, in-
cluding "knowing involvement in offering or providing a
prospective or an enrolled student-athlete an improper induce-
ment or extra benefit. '123
More directly on point, a number of NCAA Bylaws address as-
pects of the package deal, and thus have the potential to be ex-
tended to effectively bar, or restrict, the practice. Article 13.2.1
generally prohibits an "institution's staff member or any representa-
tive of its athletics interests . . . [from being involved] directly or
indirectly, in making arrangements for or giving or offering to give
any financial aid or other benefits to a prospective student-athlete
or his or her relatives or friends."124 More specifically, Bylaw
13.2.1.1. (a) expressly prohibits an "employment arrangement for a
prospective student-athlete's relatives." 125 Thus, "hiring a coach on
the condition of a player's enrollment is a direct violation of [now
enacted NCAA Bylaw 13.2.1.1.(a)] . . .which prohibits any kind of
[quid pro quo] employment agreement." 126 Despite the seemingly
clear prohibition in Bylaw 13.2.1.1.(a), package deals are not only
121. See id. at art. 10.01.1. (setting principles for bylaws).
122. For a discussion of critics' viewpoints on the ethics of package deals, see
supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
123. See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 48, at art. 10.1(c) (providing example of
unethical conduct).
124. See id. at art. 13.2.1 (outlining general regulations for offers and
inducements).
125. See id. at art. 13.2.1.1(a) (including illustrations of prohibited actions).
126. See Davis, supra note 58 (noting that the Bylaw's intention is to bar rela-
tives from being hired as a condition of the student's enrollment at the school).
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in existence, but are becoming commonplace.' 27 The difficulty
posed by using this provision to regulate and prevent the practice,
is the requirement to prove that the hiring arrangement was done
with the express intent and reason of inducing the player to the
school. Schools may circumvent this prohibition by simply citing a
prospective coach's other attributes beyond that of their personal
connection to the player. For example, USC has cited the personal-
ity and "great demeanor" of Dwayne Polee as the primary reasons
for his hire, while downplaying his limited coaching experience,
professional playing career, and the talents of his son.128 While
such hires may perhaps be easily proved on a circumstantial basis,
the absence of any clear evidence showing an explicit intent for a
quid pro quo arrangement provides a serious impediment to any
potential NCAA sanctions. 129
Additionally, the Bylaws impose restrictions on package deals
in two other separate provisions which address the ability of schools
to contract with high school or two-year college coaches for future
employment.13 0 These provisions mandate that such coaches may
not begin work for the university while remaining associated with a
former school. 131 While universities are permitted to make such
hires, the Bylaws specifically dictate that these hires may not be
"contingent upon the enrollment of a prospective student-ath-
lete."13 2 Just as the prohibition on package deals under Article
13.2.1.1. (a) is rendered practically ineffective due to the difficulties
in proving a contingent hire of the athlete's parent, the prohibition
on conditional hires per Articles 11.4.1.1 and 13.8.3.3.1 is made fu-
tile if the NCAA must first affirmatively prove an intent that coaches
were hired based on an arrangement to bring along a player.
Regardless of the difficulties in establishing a package deal as a
sanctionable violation of NCAA Bylaws, the inherent perception
that teams are offering coaching positions solely to lure athletes to
enroll in their universities does not comport with the ideals of eq-
127. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 48, at art. 13.2.1.1.(a) (prohibiting package
deals). See also OUTSIDE THE LINES: PACKAGE DEALS, supra note 6 (detailing growing
popularity of package deals and its impact on collegiate athletics).
128. See Bolch, supra note 50 (discussing USC hiring recruit's father).
129. See Davis, supra note 58. As Davis relates, the NCAA has acknowledged
that it is "very difficult at times to prove that these [hires] are being done for the
specific intent to secure the recruitment of a prospect." Id. (quoting LuAnn
Humphrey, associate director of enforcement for NCAA).
130. See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 48, at Arts. 11.4.1.1, 13.8.3.3.1 (discussing
contracting with coaches).
131. Id.
132. See id. (providing guidelines for contracting with coaches).
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uity and honest competition the NCAA seeks to uphold. 1' 3 While
the spirit of the Bylaws may have been violated by the conduct of
universities engaging in package deals, nevertheless such teams
have not broken any specific regulations.13 4 As the NCAA has tools
in place to address the dilemma, revisions to existing Bylaws and
regulations may prove the best means of addressing and closing the
loopholes currently permitting the practice.
V. REGULATING PACKAGE DEALS AND SUGGESTED
MEANS FOR REFORM
Mechanisms for reform to close the loophole permitting the
legality of package deals in recruitment is necessary in order to ful-
fill the NCAA's long held policies of ensuring fair and even compe-
tition among its member universities.1 3 5  As noted by legal
commentators, the NCAA is "dedicated to the objective, as de-
scribed in its first constitution, of maintaining athletic activities 'on
an ethical plane in keeping with the dignity and high purpose of
education. "' 136
Furthermore, the original NCAA constitution called for the
member schools to "agree to take control of student athletic sports,
as far as may be necessary to maintain in them a high standard of
personal honor, eligibility, and fair play, and to remedy whatever
abuses may exist."137 As the use of package deals creates, at the very
least, a perception of impropriety, it is in the best interest of the
NCAA and college athletics to prevent this practice. 3 8 Conse-
133. See, e.g., NCAA Bylaws, supra note 48, at art. 2.4 (explaining ethical con-
duct in athletics).
134. See Davis, supra note 8 (clarifying how package deals are not prohibited
per se).
135. See RonaldJ. Waicukauski, The Regulation of Academic Standards in Intercol-
legiate Athletics, LAw & AMATEUR SPORTS, 162, 181 (RonaldJ. Waicukauski ed., Indi-
ana Univ. Press 1982) (discussing creation of NCAA). "The NCAA was formally
organized on March 31, 1906, following a conference convened late in 1905 by
President Theodore Roosevelt .... Roosevelt was concerned in particular about
brutality in intercollegiate football and what he perceived as an increasingly perva-
sive win-at-any-cost philosophy ... [and he created the] NCAA 'to codify, promul-
gate, and enforce rules and regulations which would ensure proper behaviors on
and off the field.'" Id.; see also W. Burlette Carter, The Age of Innocence: The First 25
Years of The National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931, 8 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 211, 215-17 (2006) (featuring NCAA during its formative years).
136. See Waicukauski, supra note 135, at 162 (setting forth foundation of
NCAA).
137. See Carter, supra note 135, at 220 (highlighting NCAA founding principle
of schools' responsibility in regulating ethics in collegiate sports).
138. See SallyJenkins, College Athletics'Rookie Mistake, WASH. POST, June 2, 2009,
at D1 (postulating that restoring "competitive balance" is key reason for enacting
reforms in collegiate sports).
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quently, this article notes a number of different means for regula-
tion and restriction.
A. Lowering the Standard of Proof of Existing NCAA Bylaws
As discussed earlier in this article, a number of the NCAA's
Bylaws are sufficiently equipped to address the issue of package
deals. Due to the heightened requirements of demonstrating in-
tent of an illicit quid pro quo arrangement, these Bylaws have
proved to be ineffective in slowing the popularity of the practice.
Thus, one additional means of rectifying the loophole permitting
package deals is to lower the standard of proof necessary to find
violations.
Bylaw 13.2.1.1 (a) prohibits any kind of "employment arrange-
ment for a prospective student-athlete's relatives." 139 As this provi-
sion has proven to be ineffective, I propose creating an additional
new provision that would permit NCAA officials to better conclude
that such an arrangement has taken place. While the language will
likely need to be subsequently fine tuned, the following may be
used as an example:
Proof of the existence of such an employment arrangement
prohibited by Bylaw 13.2.1.1.(a) does not need to be express. A
violation of this Bylaw occurs, if given the totality of the circum-
stances, it can be concluded that the hiring was more likely than
not made for the purpose of securing the commitment and enroll-
ment of a student-athlete.
With this lowered standard of proof, much of the difficulty in
proving explicit intent is eliminated. 140 Consequently, this lower
threshold will permit the NCAA enforcement committee to easily
determine and find violations of NCAA Bylaws. Schools would
likely be less willing to engage in the practice over the fear and
threat of potential sanctions.1 4 1 Also, this lowered standard of
proof proposal would also not necessarily preclude universities
from hiring individuals who have a prior standing relationship with
other players. 142 Instead, such a proposal would eliminate the
more egregious examples of package deals, while permitting those
arrangements where a person has significant attractive attributes to
139. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 48, at art. 13.2.1.1 (a).
140. Cf Davis, supra note 8 (claiming how intent is hard to prove with current
regime).
141. Cf id. (explaining difficulties of determining violations under current
Bylaws).
142. Id. (explaining implications of lower standard).
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offer a team regardless of personal connection. 43 Schools serious
about offering a potential package deal would first need to deter-
mine if there is sufficient objective proof to show that the hiring is
based on more than a quid pro quo arrangement to procure the
elite athlete's commitment. 144 Thus a coach bringing significant
prior experience to a university in addition to a prospective athlete
would likely meet the objective proof standard.
1. An Outright Bar of the Practice
Certainly the most effective mechanism for regulating the use
of package deals is to create an outright ban on the practice. This
rule would bar any relative or coach of an athlete from being em-
ployed by the athlete's university in any capacity.145 Additionally, it
would also prohibit a school from circumventing the regulation by
giving an athlete's associate a "straw-man" position elsewhere in the
university. The perception of improper recruitment would be mini-
mized as the possibility that an athlete is drawn to a school based on
a benefit to an athlete's associate is eliminated.
Admittedly, such a proposal is likely overbroad and extreme as
a means of restricting and regulating the use of package deals. 146
Furthermore, such an outright ban would likely violate a common
labor law policy which strictly interprets any condition that affects
the right of an individual to pursue a chosen livelihood. 47 In Cali-
fornia for example, Business and Professions Code Section 16600
prohibits conditions whereby a party "is restrained from engaging
in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind."1 48 A number
of cases assert that arrangements limiting a person's right to work
should not be permitted beyond any means solely necessary to pro-
143. Id. (detailing package deal arrangements).
144. Cf id. (maintaining that schools are not currently deterred away from
package deals).
145. See Steve Weinberg, Knight: Solutions Exist for Fixing NCAA 's One-and-done
Problem, USA TODAY, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
college/mensbasketball/2009-06-23-knight-one-and-doneN.htm. Former college
basketball coach Bob Knight has suggested that barring "AAU and other nonpro-
fessional, potentially unscrupulous summer-league coaches ... (from] the recruit-
ing process" would be a means of fixing the problems in the NCAA. Id.
146. See generally infra notes 147-157 and accompanying text (discussing how
an outright ban may be in contrary to established public policy and unfairly punish
innocent parties).
147. See Steve Weinberg & Marlen Garcia, Amid One-and-Done Issues, Troubles
Shadow College Hoops, USA TODAY, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.
com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2009-06-23-ncaa-basketball-troublesN.htm
(illuminating that stricter eligibility requirements is extreme).
148. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 2009) (providing labor law
policy).
(Vol. 17: p. 59
24
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss1/2
A PERCEPTION IN IMPROPRIETY
tect an employer's interests. For example, in American Broadcasting
Companies v. Wolf, the court wrestled with the issue of whether a
television network could enforce a non-competition clause in a
broadcaster's employment contract that would effectively bar that
broadcaster from beginning work for a competing network.1 49 The
court concluded that public policy disfavors anti-competitive cove-
nants in contracts, because they would be enforcing policies that
would affect a party's right to a livelihood and work.150 Similarly, in
the context of trade secret disputes, courts resist enforcing restric-
tive covenants that prevent departing employees from beginning
work at competing companies. 151 Only in instances where the
court has determined that a particular employer would be irrepara-
bly harmed by the party's employment with a competitor, have
these courts enforced limitations on a person's ability to work. 152
Even in such cases, these restrictions must be carefully tailored in
such a manner so that it does not extend any greater than is neces-
sary to protect the employer's trade secrets.1 53
149. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 367-68 (N.Y. 1981). In that
case, ABC entered into an employment contract with sportscaster Warner Wolf,
which included a good faith renewal clause that would govern negotiations at the
end of the contract term. Id. at 364. The contract also included a non-competi-
ion clause, which prevented Wolf from working as a broadcaster for a competing
network for a period of three months in the event that a renewed contract could
not be negotiated. Id. Ultimately, Wolf and ABC could not agree on a new em-
ployment contract, leading Wolf to accept an offer with CBS. Id. at 365. Subse-
quently, ABC sought to enjoin Wolf from starting his new position with CBS. Id.
150. See id. at 366-68 (holding that defendant is not barred from accepting
competing job offer); see, e.g., Metro Traffic Control v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22
Cal. App. 4th 853, 859-60 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1994) (stating that "California courts
have consistently declared [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600] an expression of
public policy to ensure that every citizen shall retain the right to pursue any lawful
employment and enterprise of their choice."); see also Latona v. Aetna United
States Healthcare, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1093-97 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (carving out
exemptions to CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600).
151. See Modern Env'ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 561 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Va. 2002) (rul-
ing non-competition agreement unenforceable).
152. See Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 174-77 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (finding former employer to potentially be irreparably harmed); Lowry
Computer Prods. v. Head, 984 F. Supp. 1111, 1115-17 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (discuss-
ing amount of confidential knowledge warranting non-compete agreement); Wex-
ler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 433-34 (Pa. 1960) (discussing employment
requirements necessitating non-compete agreement).
153. See generally SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir.
1985) (ruling on former employees' use of trade secrets); Smith v. BIC Corp., 869
F.2d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 1989) (defining "trade secret"); Comprehensive Techs. Intl.
v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730 (4th Cir. 1993) (describing terms of employ-
ment covenant as enforceable); Reed Roberts Assoc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590,
593-94 (N.Y. 1976) (differentiating knowledge of business operations versus quali-
fying trade secret).
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An alternative to enacting an outright ban on universities from
hiring associates of elite players is preventing the enrollment of any
prospective student athlete where an associate of theirs has been
previously hired by the school. 154 This proposal would be ineffec-
tive due to the inequity in barring an athlete from pursuing an edu-
cation at a desired school. Despite skepticism to the contrary,
student athletes are first and foremost attending college for educa-
tional reasons, with intercollegiate competition a secondary fo-
cus. 1 55 Although, such a proposal would effectively close the
loophole allowing the practice, by taking away much of the impetus
for engaging a package deal, the student athlete would be the one
perhaps unfairly punished for the wrong doing of others.
A ban on package deals may nonetheless remain a viable op-
tion if limited exceptions and sufficient safeguards are created in
order to avoid implicating the public policy against over restricting
employment. Certainly, there may be instances where hiring a
coach is based on the merits of the coach's qualifications, and not
based on their contacts to elite athletes. Thus, an outright ban
would unfairly punish a coach, regardless of qualifications, by
preventing their hiring simply because of that coach's past relation-
ships. 156 This proposal may also unfairly prevent young coaches an
opportunity to gain experience serving as an assistant on a Division
I team. Coach John Calipari has previously noted that assistant
coaching positions on his staff are often filled by people looking to
enter college coaching. 15 7 As this Article seeks to provide proposals
154. See infra note 155-156 and accompanying text (addressing the potential
effect of barring students from attending the school of their choice).
155. See, e.g., Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploita-
tion of College Athletes, 18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307 (1998) (analyzing universities'
economic interests over student-athlete interests); Kristin R. Muenzen, Weakening
its Own Defense? The NCAA's Version of Amateurism, 13 MAR. SPORTS L. REv. 257
(2003) (describing university athletics' evolution toward professional sports mod-
els); Tanyon T. Lynch, Quid Pro Quo: Restoring Educational Primacy to College Basket-
ball, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 595 (2002) (detailing changes in NBA organization
affecting students playing college basketball).
156. For example, Scott Pera, former high school coach of standout James
Harden, was highly accomplished coach in his own right. See McLane, supra note
60. Pera had coached a Pennsylvania high school team to a state championship
prior to his move to California. Id. During his term at Artesia High School in
Lakewood, California, Pera established the school as a perennial candidate for
state championships in basketball. Id.
157. See Garcia, supra note 65 (discussing Memphis's use of package deals); see
also Hoffarth, supra note 111 (quoting USC Coach Tim Floyd on his hiring of po-
tential recruit, Dwayne Polee Jr.'s, father, "I think he's more qualified than 90
percent of the assistants that come into college basketball based on his playing
experience and what he can bring to the table for us at SC through his contacts in
our area.").
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for reform and the means of regulating unethical coaching ar-
rangements, an outright ban would be overly expansive to accom-
plish this result.
2. Applying a Presumption of Illegality
A previously introduced proposal by the NCAA may also be re-
vived as potential solution to address the practice. A group of
NCAA leaders in conjunction with NBA Commissioner David Stern
recommended instituting increased hiring standards as a means of
addressing "connect-the-dots hires."' 58 Specifically, the group advo-
cated that when "an institution hires an individual who has either
coached or is related to a prospect that ultimately enrolls at that
institution, there should be a rebuttable presumption that the hir-
ing violates NCAA legislation."'1 59 The group further argued that
this "presumption would be triggered if the individual were hired
within two years, either before or after, of the prospect's initial en-
rollment at the institution." 160 Any hires that would trigger the pre-
sumptions of this proposal would then shift the burden to "the
institution to prove to the enforcement staff that the hiring did not
violate NCAA rules." 16 1
The proposal was immediately met with criticism regarding its
merits in principle versus its practicality. 162 Furthermore, the pro-
posal would essentially turn a long-standing American credo of "in-
nocent until proven guilty," on its head. 163 Instead, the onus would
be on the university to prove that the hiring was done with a legiti-
mate purpose. 164 As the NCAA currently has difficulty in proving
improper intent by colleges, universities forced to rebut the pre-
sumption of illegality under the aforementioned proposal would
additionally have similar difficulties in establishing a proper hire. 65
158. Davis, supra note 8. As the article noted, the main purpose of this investi-
gative group sought to look at "problems facing youth basketball," particularly at-
tempting to "[rein] in abuses in summer basketball." Id. See Wieberg & Garcia,
supra note 96 (stating concerns over misconduct have resulted in formation of
joint venture between NCAA and college coaches, ethics coalition).
159. Davis, supra note 8.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id. (reviewing reaction of coaches regarding assumption of illegality
rule).
163. See id. (exploring implications of rule assuming impropriety).
164. See id. (examining implications of application of rule).
165. See id. (discussing opening of Pandora's Box issues with applying pro-
posed rule assuming impropriety).
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Arguably, this proposal may serve to strike a proper balance
between over and under broad restrictions on the use of package
deals. Such a presumption would not necessarily bar schools from
employing package deals, but it would at least require schools to
meet and satisfy the NCAA's standards of ethics. As previously
noted, the burden of work should be on the universities to counter
the inherent perception of impropriety and unethical conduct sur-
rounding package deal arrangements.1 66 While this proposal
would require some fine tuning, such as establishing how stringent
a standard and what level of proof would be necessary to meet the
burden of persuasion, it would also correctly force the individual
universities to prove the propriety of their planned hire. 1
6 7
D. Enacting a "Rooney Rule" Like Procedure
for Package Deal Hires
An additional mechanism of reform to address the practice of
package deals is the enactment of a bylaw similar to the "Rooney
Rule" currently in place in the National Football League (NFL).1 68
The rule was named after Pittsburgh Steelers owner Dan Rooney,
the chair of the [NFL's] Diversity Committee and proponent of the
regulation. 169 In an effort to address historical barriers facing mi-
norities seeking head coaching positions in the NFL, the league en-
acted a new regulation mandating "every NFL team interview at
least one minority candidate upon the vacancy of a head coaching
position."'170 A further requirement dictated that these interviews
must be "meaningful," and "that the interviewers be among the
team's primary decision-makers."' 7'1 The Rooney Rule has been
166. See Streeter, supra note 98 (discussing perception of impropriety at USC
in particular). For discussion of the responsibilities of individual universities
under the NCAA leaders' proposal see supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
167. See Davis, supra note 8 (addressing opposing opinions to proposed stan-
dard where universities would be guilty until proven innocent).
168. Brain A. Maravent, Is the Rooney Rule Affirmative Action? Analyzing the NFL's
Mandate to Its Clubs Regarding Coaching and Front Office Hires, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 233,
240 (2006) (focusing on Rooney Rule).
169. Id.
170. Brian W. Collins, Tackling Unconscious Bias in Hiring Practices: The Plight of
the Rooney Rule, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 870, 871 (2007); see also N. Jeremi Duru, The Fritz
Pollard Alliance, the Rooney Rule, and the Quest to "Level the Playing Field" in the National
Football League, 7 VA. SPORTS & ETrr. L.J. 179, 189 (2008) (discussing invention and
implementation of mandatory interview rule).
171. Duru, supra note 170, at 189.
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lauded for its marked effects of increasing minority head coaches in
the NFL, and increasing opportunities for such positions. 172
Modeled after the NFL's Rooney Rule, a proposed means of
regulating the use of package deals is to establish a system whereby
collegiate coaching positions would be subject to a series of require-
ments prior to being filled. Under this proposal, universities who
have an opening on the staff of their athletic teams would be obli-
gated to interview candidates who do not have any prior existing
relationship with an athlete being recruited by the university. Such
interviews must be meaningful and along with the head coach,
should include other key decision makers of the university such as
the University Athletic Director and, if possible, the University Pres-
ident or Chancellor. 173
Admittedly recognizing that this proposal shares the same criti-
cism proffered by opponents of the Rooney Rule, such criticism
would be as applicable to the situation herein. Critics of the
Rooney Rule argue that the forced interviewing of a minority candi-
date simply requires teams to offer candidates sham interviews with-
out any intention to actually hire minority coaching candidates. 174
Others have argued, however, that interviews conducted under the
auspices of the Rooney Rule have provided such candidates an op-
portunity to surprise hiring managers and meaningfully compete
for the positions.175 Thus, schools seeking to hire an athlete's asso-
ciate as part of a package deal may interview other applicants for
the express purpose of satisfying the requirements of this rule, with-
172. See Michael J. Nichols, Time for a Hail Mary? With Bleak Prospects of Being
Aided by a College Version of the NFL's Rooney Rule, Should Minority College Football
Coaches Turn Their Attention to Title VII Litigation?, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. LJ. 147, 157-
58 (2008) (highlighting increase in minority coaches following Rooney Rule).
173. Cf Maravent, supra note 168, at 242 (outlining interview guidelines for
NFL clubs under Rooney Rule).
174. See Hub Arkush, Honorable Intentions Aside, 'Rooney Rule' Is Unfair, PRO
FOOTBALLWEEKLY.COM, Dec. 20, 2004, http://pfivweb.goisg.net/PFW/Commen-
tary/Columns/2004/harkushvl924.htm; Bob Hohler, Rooney Rule Cited for its Effec-
tiveness, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 2006, at E9; Jay Nordlinger, Color in Coaching:
How Racial Games Are Played in the NFL, NATIONAL REVIEW, Sept. 1, 2003, at 25
(quoting Gene Upshaw, head of NFL Players Association, who argued that Rooney
Rule would "lead to sham interviews and sham lists."). Nordlinger also noted that
other commentators have argued that the rule would lead to "courtesy interviews"
and tokenism during the coaching search process. Id.; see also Collins, supra note
170, at 901-02 ("[I]f an accomplished coach like Mariucci is under consideration,
the Rule merely results in an elaborate public charade, in which a team must con-
tact candidates it has no interest in hiring.").
175. See Hohler, supra note 174 (noting comment made by Richard Lapchick
that "I think it's been proven in the NFL that when [minority] candidates are
brought into the room under any circumstances they have surprised some people
and gotten a real shot at a job.").
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out any intention to actually hire them. Certainly, colleges who
make arrangements for package deals with the knowledge that such
packages may violate the spirit of NCAA bylaws would likewise not
be overly concerned with the ethical ramifications of holding sham
interviews. This Article recognizes the difficulty of effectively elimi-
nating the practice of package deals, and it is not the intention to
propose means to meet this end. On the contrary, this Article seeks
to only raise potential means of creating obstacles for schools look-
ing to employ package deals and decreasing the prevalence of these
arrangements. By mandating interviews of non-affiliated candi-
dates, schools may be impressed by the qualifications of such candi-
dates, thereby giving such parties an opportunity for the
position. 176 Creating an additional hoop for schools to jump
through in order to clear potential package deal hires may also
have the effect of creating a sufficient impediment that schools may
find outweighing any benefit such a hire may bring.
An additional hurdle to the efficacy of a Rooney Rule-like pro-
posal is the NCAA's reluctance to become overly involved in the
hiring decisions of their individual member schools. 177 NCAA Pres-
ident Myles Brand had argued that efforts to enact a version of the
Rooney Rule to improve minority hiring in the collegiate ranks are
outside the bounds of power which the organization is responsible
for.'7 8 Specifically, Brand argued that individual "institutions are
wholly responsible for the hiring of coaches and administrators...
[and no] outside body, such as the NCAA, should usurp the author-
ity or responsibility of universities and colleges in hiring."179 None-
theless, as Michael Nichols' article has indicated, such criticism
176. As a number of commentator's have opined, the Rooney Rule has given
candidates the opportunity to surprise hiring managers, which they may not have
had otherwise. See, e.g., Aaron T. Walker, Title VII & MLB Minority Hiring: Alterna-
tives to Litigation, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 245 n. 166 (2007) (noting that "if
teams are compelled to expand their pool they eventually will see that there are
many qualified minority applicants" as a benefit of the Rooney Rule.); Hannah
Gordon, The Robinson Rule: Models for Addressing Race Discrimination in the Hiring of
NCAA Head Football Coaches, 15 SPORTS L.J. 1, 10-11 (2008) (relating that "even if
some 'courtesy' interviews do occur, the overall benefit [of the Rooney Rule] has
been worthwhile ... [since] one never knows when a coach will surprise his inter-
viewers and beat out the favored candidate.").
177. See Nichols, supra note 172, at 161 (" [T] he NCAA claims that it is not in a
position to affect whom its member programs interview and hire at least, by use of
hard variants.").
178. See id. (discussing Brand's statements).
179. Id. (quoting Myles Brand, NCAA President, NCAA Convention State of
Association speech, Jan. 5, 2007, available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?Con-
tentID=40976).
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A PERCEPTION IN IMPROPRIETY
holds less weight in light of the ability of the NCAA to regulate a
wide range of matters affecting universities.1 8 0
As one of the main tenets of the NCAA is to promote amateur-
ism and regulate ethical competition among its member institu-
tions, it is in the best interest of the organization to take the high
road, and eliminate any perception of impropriety.181 Thus, cen-
tralized efforts to ensure that the hiring of coaches is done in a
principled manner and for an ethical purpose should take prece-
dence over the organization's reluctance to become involved in
micromanaging universities' hires.
Lastly, the absence of any penalty mechanism that could be
levied against any NFL teams who failed to adhere to the Rooney
Rule was a common criticism regarding the efficacy of the regula-
tion in professional football.182 Consequently, any proposal akin to
the Rooney Rule used to regulate package deals in collegiate
recruiting, would need to include some form of sanctions that may
be employed to penalize schools who make hires without following
established interviewing procedures. Otherwise, the overall effec-
tiveness of any such proposal would be minimized. Ideally, the
stigma associated with engaging in this practice may be sufficient
impetus for schools to become compliant with this proposal, similar
to how the Rooney Rule's efficacy may be partly due to the forced
breakdown of previous hiring methods which were based primarily
on interpersonal relationships to the detriment of minority
candidates.L8s
180. See id. at 162 (explaining indications of Nichols' article).
As Nichols relates:
While many areas constitute powers delegated to the NCAA by its
member institutions (e.g., drug testing), many others involve general au-
thority delegated to the NCAA to govern member institutions that is
often times at odds with the interests of individual institutions (e.g., ban
on culturally insensitive mascots or team names). To say the NCAA can-
not impose interview requirements for the hiring of coaches seems to be
a convenient way of skirting responsibility.
Id.
181. For a discussion of NCAA rules on ethical conduct, see supra notes 109-
134 and accompanying text.
182. See Duru, supra note 170, at 190 (discussing consequences of no penalty
mechanism for Rooney Rule). See also Neil Forester, The Elephant in the Locker
Room: Does the National Football League Discriminate in the Hiring of Head Coaches?, 34
McGEORGE L. REV. 877, 899 (2003) (commentating that a problem of the Rooney
Rule is "its general lack of enforcement mechanisms and its failure to provide a
positive incentive by which a team owner or general manager might be en-
couraged to follow its mandate.").
183. See generally Collins, supra note 170, at 905-06 (ascertaining that Rooney
Rule's primary purpose was to address persistence of unconscious bias and pin-
pointing that its effectiveness lies in its potential to deconstruct those hidden bi-
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VI. CONCLUSION
The inherent unethical stigma attached to the use of package
deals in collegiate basketball recruiting is an issue that must be ad-
dressed by the NCAA in light of the increased prevalence of the
tactic in recent years. 184 As coaches and universities today are ac-
tively and blatantly exploiting a known loophole in the NCAA By-
laws that permit the existence of this practice, measures to correct
this oversight and close this loophole are necessary. 185 As this Arti-
cle proposes, a number of different means can be effectively initi-
ated so that the NCAA may continue its desire to clean up
competition in college athletics. 186 By making the practice more
difficult to employ, either by turning the onus of proving the pro-
priety of the hire to the universities, or through the use of more
transparent and open hiring procedures, teams seeking to use pack-
age deals may be forced to weigh the benefit of the arrangement in
light of such extra requirements. 187 Alternatively, the threat of eas-
ier to establish violations of existing regulations may serve a similar
function in deterring the employment of this practice. 188
With the recent increased attention on package deals and re-
newed efforts for enacting reforms, the NCAA has an opportunity
to ensure that parties seeking to circumvent the spirit of ethical and
fair competitions will have to engage in extra efforts and oversight
to carry out their plans.' 8 9 By stemming the widespread use of
package deals, college basketball as a whole would benefit by having
one less specter of impropriety hovering over its history.
ases in traditional "old boy network" of football through forced social interaction
between once excluded minorities and members of "old boy network").
184. For a further discussion of the ethics of package deals, see supra notes 91-
101 and accompanying text.
185. For a further discussion of the loophole in the NCAA Bylaws and the
necessity for change, see supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
186. For a further discussion of potential changes to the NCAA Bylaws, see
supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
187. For a further discussion of requiring universities to demonstrate the pro-
priety of a hired athletic employee and the consequences, see supra notes 158-167
and accompanying text.
188. For a further discussion of implying the assumption of illegality, see
supra notes 158-167 and accompanying text.
189. For a further discussion of potential means for the NCAA to regulate
package deals, see supra notes 109-134 and accompanying text.
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